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AN EXAMINATION OF TAX LAW AND
SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS:
CREED OF GREED OR OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL?
I. INTRODUCTION
Since American Patriots proclaimed their opposition to the oppres-
sive colonial rule of King George III with the rallying cry of "no
taxation without representation,"' the debate over taxation, in whatever
form and in the fullness of time, has run like a thread from revolutionary
times to the present. 2 Indeed, this debate is often characterized by
radically different views 3 of the role of taxation in a civilized society.4
In the twentieth century, the philosophies of Franklin D. Roosevelt
and Ronald W. Reagan aptly demonstrate this polemic. 5 President
Roosevelt, perhaps the greatest figure in American politics in the twenti-
eth century, believed that taxes were the unavoidable price one must pay
to live in a free society. 6 Building from this rather uncontroversial
1. RUSSELL KIK, THE ROOTS OF AMEuCAN ORDER 323-24 (1974).
2. The debate over the proper role of taxation is not, of course, limited to the American Revolu-
tion. For some philosophical and practical criticism see ADAM S Mrr, AN INQUIRY ImO THE NATURE
AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, (R. H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976) (1776); GEORGE
WASHINGTON, THE WASHNGTON PAPES: BASIc S ELECnONS FROM THE PUBLC AND PRIVATE WRINGS oF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, (Saul K. Padover ed., 1955).
3. See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax
Movement: A Typical Male Reaction 86 Mich. L. Rev. 465 (1987) (discussing progressive tax
schemes and alternatives).
4. For example, in 1787, a minority of twenty-one members of the Pennsylvanian Convention
which opposed that state's ratification of the new Constitution expressed their concern over the ability
of the central government to lay and collect taxes.
The power of direct taxation will further apply to every individual, as congress may tax
land, cattle, trades, occupations, etc. in any amount, and every object of internal taxation
is of that nature, that however oppressive, the people will have but this alternative,
except to pay the tax, or let their property be taken, for all the resistance will be in vain.
The standing army and select militia would enforce the collection.
THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DissNrr OF Tm MINoRrrY OF THE CONVENTION OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR
CONSTITUENTS (December 18, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTrI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTrnUnON-
AL. CONVENTION DEBATES 252-53 (Ralph Ketchum ed., 1986). The Pennsylvania Convention voted 46 to
23 to ratify the new constitution on December 12, 1787. Id. at 237.
5. RicHARD H oFSrADTER, THE A MERICAN POLmiICAL TmRADroN AND THE MEN WHOM ADE IT 411-
456 (Vintage Books 1989) (1948); EDWIN MEESE Ill, WITH REAGAN: THE INSIDE STORY 117-162
(1992).
6. In a 1936 campaign address, President Roosevelt shared his grand vision of the tax code:
In 1776 the fight was for democracy in taxation. In 1936 that is still the fight. Mr. Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes once said: "Taxes are the price we pay for civilized society."
One sure way to determine the social conscience of a Government is to examine the way
taxes are collected and how they are spent. And one sure way to determine the social
conscience of an individual is to get his tax-reaction. Taxes, after all, are the dues we
pay for the privileges of membership in an organized society.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address at Worcester, Mass. (October 21, 1936), in 5 THE PUBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 522,523 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938).
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position, Roosevelt framed the parameters of American political
discourse for the next sixty years.7
On the other hand, President Reagan, a Republican, while consider-
ing the essential, and obvious, continuity of taxation-which is, of
course, that government must have means by which to raise revenues
-nevertheless saw the issue rather differently. President Reagan believ-
ed, first and foremost, that tax revenue belonged to the people and that
the federal government exists for the people. As such, the people ought
to keep more of their money and the government ought to receive less.
President Reagan sought to empower citizens and not the government.9
Though the philosophies forwarded by Reagan and Roosevelt are
separated by over four decades, it would not be an exaggeration to
maintain, in the fullest philosophical view, that both philosophies contin-
ue to be harmonious with the broad spectrum of political thinking in
their respective parties.10 This article contours the philosophical and
practical public policy of the above-outlined debate by scrutinizing tax
law in the 1920s and by tracing the idea and practice of tax cuts into the
1960s and 1980s. By elucidating the general macroeconomic effects of
taxation in terms of distribution of the tax burden, receipts to the Trea-
sury, investment and economic growth, this article will provide an eco-
nomic and public policy framework through which the current political
and economic debate over tax reform can be appropriately viewed.
It is important to note, given its colossal size, that an intricate and
exhaustive dissection of the Internal Revenue Code will not be
7. Ronald Reagan, who voted for President Roosevelt four times, himself has conceded as much.
RONALD REAGAN, AN AMEitcAN LIFE 66-67,316 (1990).
8. HENRY HAZLrr, ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON 39 (1946).
9. President Reagan drove this point home forcefully in an address to business and government
leaders on June 11, 1981:
Now, it's that simple. Our opponents want more money from your family budgets so they
can spend it on the federal budget and make it remain high. Maybe it's time that you and
millions like you remind them of a few simple facts. It's your money, not theirs. You
earned it. They didn't. You have every right to keep a bigger share than you've been
allowed to keep for a great many years now. When they insist we can't reduce taxes
and spending and balance the budget too, one six word answer will do: "Yes, we can.
And yes, we will."
For too long, government has stood in the way of what our people earn, no matter
how hard they try. It's almost become economics without a soul. And that's why the
ultimate goal in everything that we're trying to do is to give this economy back to the
American people.
RONALD W. REAGAN, RONALD REAGAN: THE WISDOM AND HuMOR OF THE GREAT COMMUNICATOR 78
(Frederick J. Ryan Jr. ed., 1995).
10. This statement is not intended to represent, in anyway, that every single member of the Re-
publican Party and Democratic Party are entirely united in supporting these particular views. Rather, it
is offered as a statement of general philosophical principle in each party.
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provided;" it would indeed be an accomplishment of Herculean
proportion, given the space constraints of this article, to provide anything
more than a cursory view of this vital, but enormously complex, area of
the law. The objective of this article is rather more humble: to strip
away political rhetoric from the field of tax law to provide, through the
framework of a public policy debate, a lucid view of the objectives of
contemporary tax law. As such, two objectives can be properly achieved.
First, a long and popularly held, yet perhaps cynical, belief, well stated by
Justice James C. McReynolds, that "[1]ogic and taxation are not always
the best friends" 12 may finally be controverted. The second, and
perhaps more important objective is to demonstrate a serious practical
contradiction in the "progressive"13 consideration of taxation and, by
extension, thereby demonstrate the policy alternative offered by an
inclusive pro-growth approach to tax law and economics. 14
The doctrinaire left, or those advocating a more "progressive"
approach to politics and economics, face a dilemma created largely by
the rigidity of their own rhetoric, and a failure to recognize the apparent
incongruence of two main tenets of liberal thinking. The first tenet is
that the left wishes to maximize the resources available to the federal
government to promote "investment" in people.1 5 President Clinton
emphasized this view in his February 17, 1993, address before a joint
session of Congress, stating, "I believe Government must do more."16
The second core belief is that a large disparity in wealth, between rich
and poor, is morally wrong within a progressive social democracy' 7 and
11. Indeed, the Internal Revenue Code spans some 1,378 pages and the five volume companion
set entitled the Federal Tax Regulations 1994, runs some 6,439 pages. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN
RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAx 5 (2d ed. 1995).
12. Sonnebor Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 522 (1923) (McReynolds, J., concurring).
13. Though one can certainly disagree with the use of this word to describe leftist philosophy, it is
offered here in its commonly understood meaning.
14. MiLToN FRIEDMAN &ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: APERSONALSTATEMENT 306-07 (First
Harvest / HBJ ed. 1990); DICK AmEY, THE FREEDOM REVOLUrION 149-92 (1995).
15. See BILL CLINTON & ALBERT GORE, PUTrINO PEOPLE FIRST: How WE CAN ALL CHANGE
AMERICA 126-28 (1992) (outlining some of Governor Clinton's more traditional Democratic policy
investments: guaranteed health care, increasing the minimum wage, family and medical leave, life-
time training, adult literacy programs, unemployment benefit extensions, non-college training pro-
grams, etc.). See generally ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT: TRANSMrrED To CONGRESS FEBRUARY
1994, H. Doc. No. 103-178m 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter 1994 ECONOMIC REPORT] (out-
lining the Clinton Administration's policy objectives for the nation's future).
16. William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals. in 1
PuB. PAPERS, 1993, at 113, 114 (1994).
17. Robert Kuttner, Real Class War, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY ED. July 31 - Aug. 6, 1995, at 5.
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it is, therefore, the federal government's responsibility to promote
egalitarianism' 8 through a highly progressive tax system.19
Theoretically, equality is achieved quite simply-tax the wealthy20
and redistribute that income through federally administered social pro-
grams to the poor or less fortunate. 21 Yet, herein lies the contradiction:
Higher tax rates on wealthy Americans reduce taxable revenue for the
government and provide a disincentive to investment and economic
growth. 22 Put another way, "[h]igh tax rates represent a drag on the
economy." 23 Indeed, the inability of leftist philosophical thinking to
reconcile these conflicting ideas, a commitment to income equality, 24
18. Aleksandras Shtromas, one of the former Soviet Union's leading legal scholars, articulated
his view of social-democratic egalitarianism noting that:
Even a social-democratic welfare state is a variety of socialism, as it is nothing more
than a watered-down concept of public ownership of the means of production or, more
exactly, the primary stage of that ownership, when the state, on behalf of the public,
confiscates the "excessive" wealth of those who are better off and distributes it to those
who are less well off.
Aleksandras Shtromas, The Inevitable Collapse of Socialism, in THE GLOBAL FAILURE OF SOCIAISM 73
(1992).
19. Professor Marjorie Kornhauser provided a useful account of this view: "Other views of
humanity, such as the feminist vision, see people as interrelated and therefore support and even
mandate some progressivity." Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 518. She further stated:
I believe the choice should be progressivity with its vision of consideration for others and
its sense of common humanity rather than proportionality and its narrow vision of the
self-interested man. Although we may be self-interested, our selves are inextricably tied
to others about whom we care. It is difficult to be a hermit these days, and even if we
could be, few of us would so choose.
Id. at 523. Moreover, it is something less than controversial to suggest that these two views are
subscribed to by the American left. See CLINTON & GORE, supra note 15, at 217-232. See also ROBERT
LEKACHMAN, GREED Is NOT ENOUGH: REAOANoMIcs 191-208 (1982). Interestingly, there is some dissent
on the left concerning the utility of traditional political and legal labels and solutions particularly with
respect to traditional minority communities. Richard Delgado offers the "dialogic-community strand
of communitarian social-welfare" policy theory as a third-way. Richard Delgado, Zero-Based Racial
Politics: An Evaluation of Three Best-Case Arguments on Behalf of the NonWhite Underclass, 78 GEO.
LJ. 1929, 1931-32 (1990). Moreover, this argument is certainly not confined to the United States,
York University Professor Michael Mandel provides a helpful, though brief, account of income
disparity in Canada and its negative effect on social justice in that country. MICHAEL MANDEL, THE
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE LEGALIZATON OF POLITICS IN CANADA 239-247 (1989).
20. Admittedly, there are different views of how much one must earn to qualify as "wealthy."
Under President Clinton's Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, the change in statutory
marginal tax rates are as follows: married individuals earning between $140,000 and $250,000 saw
their marginal rate go from 31% to 36%, and those earning over $250,000 saw their marginal rate rise
from 31% to 39.6%. 1994 ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 15, at 34. Prior to the November 1994 elect-
ions, New York State, under Governor Cuomo, had a somewhat different view of what constituted
"wealthy" as a married couple making only $26,000 paid the top state income tax rate of 7.875%.
David Frum, Killing the Goose, FORBES MAGAZINE, Jan. 31, 1994, at 70, 72.
21. For an exposition of the essential theoretical foundation of this notion see THOMAS SOWELL,
MARXISM: PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 143-163 (1985) and THOMAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE
ANOINTED: SELF-CONGRATULATION AS A BASIS FOR SOCIAL POuCY (1995).
22. See generally ROBERT J. B ARTLEY, THE SEvEN FAT YEARS AND How To Do IT AGAIN 87-102
(1992) (discussing economic plans of late 1970s and early 1980s).
23. RICHARD B. MCKENZIE, WHAT WENT RIGHT IN THE 1980s 382 (1994).
24. Kuttner, supra note 17, at 5.
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and the need for ever-growing fiscal resources for so-called market cor-
rection 25 and social engineering,26 ensures the liberal elite will continue
to lurch and stumble in every direction- attempting to achieve both,
while achieving neither. 27 This truism, the effect of the income tax law
on economic decision-making, is either not understood, or is simply
ignored by those on the left who prefer to engage in divisive class
warfare by promoting the politics of envy 28 rather than attempting to put
partisan rhetoric aside to ensure stable economic growth and increased
economic opportunity for all. 29
Appropriately, former United States Representative and Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development under President Bush, Jack Kemp, the
modern prophet of supply-side economics, 30 clearly illustrated the
incontrovertible effect of higher tax rates when he stated that, "[i]t is
safe to predict that people will buy less, earn less and invest less as the
result of higher taxes. Businesses will pay and hire less. The economy
will shrink, as will tax revenues-and the deficit will soar." 31 This is the
essential point that will be demonstrated in this article through a specific
evaluation of tax law in the 1920s and a more general policy discussion
of its effect on selected subsequent administrations.
II. THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXES FROM THE
CIVIL WAR TO THE 1920s
While tariffs on imported goods had long been an important source
of revenue for the Treasury,32 the establishment of the first federal
income tax during the Civil War 33 brought the issue of federal taxation
to the forefront of American law and the American polity.34 For the first
time, the federal government of the United States was forced to turn to
income taxes to raise revenue for the war effort. 35
25. F. A. HAVE, THE FATAL CONCEIT 66-88 (W. W. Bartley III ed., 1991) (1988).
26. See A DICTIONARY OF CONSERVATIVE & LIBERTARIAN THOUGHT 159-160 (Nigel Ashford &
Stephen Davies eds., 1991).
27. WILLIAM J. BENNETr, THE DE-VALuING OF AMERICA: THE FloHT FOR OUR CULTURE AND OUR
CHrLDREN 26-30 (1992).
28. Kutmer, supra note 17, at 5.
29. Ronald Reagan, Regulatory Chokehold: Hurry Up and Wait, WALL STREET JOURNAL July 8,
1993, at A12.
30. Jack Kemp, Foreword to EDWIN S. RUBINSTEIN, THE RIoHT DATA at xv, xv-xvii (1994);
WILIAM F. BUCKLEY JR., HAPPY DAYS WERE HERE AGAIN 457-459 (1993).
31. Jack Kemp, Tax Increase is No Way to Restore the Economy, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 4, 1993,
atB3.
32. A helpful historical analysis of tariff reform in President Polk's Administration is offered in 3
PAUL H. BEROERON, THE PRESIDENCY oF JAMas K. POLK 185-90 (1987).
33. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 494 (1973).
34. For a more in-depth treatment of this period see RAN I'H E. PAUL, TAXATION IN Tim UNITED
STATES 3-109 which outlines the early period of taxation in the United States.
35. As noted legal historian Lawrence M. Friedman observed:
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After the Civil War, the income tax was repealed, though not forgot-
ten, as a means to raise revenue.36 The income tax was not absent for
long, however. In 1894, during the administration of President Grover
Cleveland, "[a] tax of 2 percent was imposed on individual incomes over
$4,000 and on the entire income of business corporations." 37 Although
the 1894 federal income tax was largely modeled after the 1864 tax
statute,38 its constitutionality was challenged in Pollock v. Farmers Loan
& Trust Co. 39 The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, eventually
ruled, after a rehearing, that a tax on underlying real property interests,
such as interest, dividends, and rents violated the prohibition on unap-
portioned "direct" taxes in the Constitution.40 In other words, all direct
taxes, in order to be constitutional, must be levied among the states in
proportion to their population. 41
This intervention by the Supreme Court, prohibiting a federal
income tax, forced the hand of Congress. If the income tax was to be
employed as a tool by which to raise revenue for the Federal Treasury,
Events thus forced the government's hand. Lincoln turned to an income tax. The tax, first
imposed in 1862, and amended in 1864, was mildly progressive; in its later revision, its
top bracket was 10 percent. The government also imposed a death tax, and new or
bigger excises on all sorts of services and goods: beer, public utilities, advertisements,
perfumes, playing cards, slaughtered cattle, and railroads, for example. Despite some
unfairness and bungling, these taxes brought in a great deal of money. In fiscal 1866,
more than $300,000,000 was collected.
FREDMAN, supra note 33, at 494-95.
36. WILLIAM A. KLEiN & JOSEPH BAUmtN, FEERL INcoME TAXATION 5 (10th ed. 1994).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 157 U.S. 429, reh'g granted, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). The Supreme Court split evenly on the
question and the Court granted a rehearing.
40. Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895). The Constitution's
prohibition of unapportioned taxes reads: "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken." US. CoNsT. art. I, § 9,
cl. 4.
41. Loren P. Beth has offered a more extensive analysis:
In the initial decision, the Supreme Court separated the law into three parts, deciding
each by a different vote. First, the Court held unanimously that a tax on income from
state and municipal bonds was essentially a tax on the state itself, violating the principle
of state sovereignty. Next, the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Melville Fuller, ruled
that a tax on income from real property was a direct tax. The Court split 6 to 2, with
Justices Edward D. White and John Marshall Harlan dissenting. Third, the Court divided
equally, Justice Howell Jackson being absent, on the question whether the general tax on
private and corporate incomes was also a direct tax. Evidence suggests that Justices
Henry B. Brown and George Shims joined White and Harlan in believing the tax constit-
utional. Thus, a major part of the tax law was left standing.
This situation pleased no one, and the Court immediately agreed to a rehearing on
the issue of taxing general income. The terminally ill Jackson struggled to Washington
undoubtedly hoping that his vote would settle the question in favor of the tax's validity.
But though Jackson voted to support the tax, another justice (probably Shiras) changed
position, producing a 5-to-4 vote invalidating the entire tax law because it was a direct
tax that had to be apportioned among the states according to their populations.
Loren P. Beth, Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF Tim UNrED STATES 634, 655 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
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Congress would be compelled to amend the Constitution.42 This process
began on July 12, 1909, when Congress passed the Sixteenth Amend-
ment43 and was completed on February 29, 1913, when the States ratified
the Sixteenth Amendment. 44 Congress now had wide discretion in the
field of taxation, though at first it showed significant restraint 5
However, with the entry of the United States into World War I on
April 7, 1917,46 the previous restraint shown by the federal government
in not raising taxes disappeared as the fiscal needs of the federal govern-
ment increased dramatically in order to fund the war effort. 47  The
United States had to shift both industry and government onto a war
footing. After a relatively brief involvement in the war, the end of the
great European conflict 48 brought the difficult domestic challenge of
dismantling the war economy to a new President. When Warren G.
Harding was sworn in as President on March 4, 1921, he boldly pledged
to "strike at war taxation" 49 and "for lightened tax burdens."50
III. THE DEBATE OVER THE GENERAL LEGISLATIVE
LANDSCAPE OF TAX POLICY IN THE 1920s
In order to make good on his bold agenda for the United States,
President Harding appointed Andrew Mellon as Secretary of the Trea-
sury. This appointment, in 1921, marked the beginning, according to
leftist scholarship, of the 1920s concupiscent love of wealth through
speculation, which eventually resulted in the disastrous Great Depres-
sion.51 This period, moreover, was marked by gross inequalities exacer-
bated by the government, 52 and in particular by Mellon's taxation
42. Jay M. Howard, Note, When Two Tax Theories Collide: A Look at the History and Future of
Progressive and Proportionate Personal Income Taxation, 32 WASHBURN LJ. 43, 47 (1992).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI specifically provides that: "The Congress shall have the power to
lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
44. HALL & RABusHKA, supra note 11, at 20.
45. To this end, "only 0.4 percent of the population filed tax returns in 1913. The personal
exemptions eliminated more than 99 percent of all individuals from the tax net." Id. at 21.
46. PAUL, supra note 34, at 113.
47. ld. at 110-23,282,296, 395, 511.
48. For further reading see HENRY KissINGER, DIPLOMACY 201-65 (1994) which discusses the
outbreak of the First World War, its execution, and the difficult aftermath.
49. WARREN G. HARDING, Inaugural Address, March 4, 1921 in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE
PRESmENrs OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON 1789 TO GEORGE BUSH 1989, at 241 (Bi-
centennial ed., 1989).
50. Id. at 242.
51. See generally JOHN K. GALBRAITH, MONEY: WHENCE IT CAME, WHERE IT WENT 183-85
(1975). A sharply contrasting view considering the causes of the Great Depression is offered in
FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 70-90.
52. Robert S. McElvaine, commenting on the growing disparity in America, said:
Prosperity was shared by fairly large segments-although certainly not all-of the
populace, but in very unequal portions. The rich were getting richer at a much more
NOTE 697
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theory with its penchant for the wealthy. 53 The conventional view of
Secretary Mellon's accomplishments, or lack thereof, at the Department
of the Treasury from 1921 to 1932, seems to be one of rather extreme
derision. 54 This school of thought has characterized the Mellon tenure
as years of greed, marked by salacious policies that shifted the tax
burden from the wealthy to the poor.55 Mellon, these historians main-
tained, established duplicitous tax policies which favored the rich and big
business while masquerading as a "helping hand for the common
man."56 This section will address and refute this demonstrably falla-
cious depiction of Secretary Mellon's policies at the Department of the
Treasury. It is resolved to defend Secretary Mellon's tax philosophy on
the grounds that it did not shift the tax burden from the wealthy to the
poor. This article will demonstrate that quite the opposite was true.57
By the end of Secretary Mellon's purposeful tenure at the Department
of the Treasury, the United State's tax code was far more egalitarian than
it had been before.58 The federal government's revenue was up, the
national debt was down, the poor and middle class were paying less and
a fortiori equitably, and wealthy Americans were shouldering a signifi-
cantly larger share of the tax burden than ever before. 59
rapid rate than the poor were becoming less poor. Government policies during the
twenties were designed to achieve just this end .... And Mellon's tax cuts for the
wealthy helped to aggravate the gross disparity in income levels.
Robert S. McElvaine, Who was Roaring in the Twenties? Origins of the Great Depression, in CoNFLICr
ANDCONSENSUS INMODERN AMERicAN HISTORY 300,305 (Allen F. Davis & Harold D. Woodman eds.,
7th ed. 1988).
53. JOHN KENNEm GALBRtArn, A JouRNEY THROUGH ECONOMIC TIME A FIRSTHAND VIEw 51 (1994).
54. James T. Patterson outlined this voxpopuli:
Mellon, who headed the Department of the Treasury until 1932, was the high priest of
business-orientated welfare capitalism-the J.P. Morgan of the "new era". Like Morgan,
he was domineering and certain that big businessmen could curb "wasteful" competition
and promote the capitalist utopia. It followed, Mellon believed, that government must
intervene to assist people who had capital. So throughout the 1920s he labored-usually
successfully-to cut taxes on the rich and on corporations. These policies widened the
gulf between the rich and the poor, concentrated capital in relatively few hands, and did
nothing to broaden consuming power, so necessary to sustain prosperity.
JAmss T. PATTERSON, AMERICA IN THE TWENrIaT CENTuRY 175 (1976).
55. See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward
Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. Li. 119 (1994) (discussing income tax policies in the United
States).
56. See GEoRGE BROWN TiNDA.L, AMmICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 1075 (2d ed., 1988) (stating
the "Mellon insisted that [tax reductions] should go mainly to the rich").
57. See generally BURTON W. FOLSOM, JR., THE MYTH OF THE RoaBR BARONS 103-20 (1991) (de-
scribing Mellon as "one of the most misunderstood men in American history" and explaining his tax
plans).




The debate, among the historical clerisy, in a historagraphical
context, over the implementation of the "Mellon plan,"60 is not simply
limited to the 1920s. The principle Secretary Mellon applied runs like
thread throughout history from Augustus to 17th and 18th century
Britain to the United States in the 1980s.61 The sacrosanct principle of
the Mellon plan, stated rather baldly, is when taxation is excessive, the
taxpayer will find ways to avoid payment. 62 In other words, when taxes
are reduced, investment in productive enterprises increases, government
revenue is raised, economic growth increases, and the opportunity for
prosperity is enhanced. 63 In Andrew Mellon's view, when faced with
excessive taxation, investors will shift capital from productive enterprises
into tax-exempt securities or other alternatives that can avoid the realiza-
tion of taxable income. This socialist abstraction serves neither the
private sector nor the government 64 as it suffocates both economic
growth for the nation and revenue growth for the government. 65
The ideological basis of the Mellon plan continues to exert consid-
erable influence on those truly interested in pro-growth tax cuts.66 As
will be expanded upon later in this article, this core philosophy, which
can be loosely termed as supply-side economics, 67 became the catalyst
for not only the income-tax reduction initiatives of President Kennedy,68
President Reagan,69 and the 104th Congress,70 but has also found itself
60. This term will refer to Andrew Mellon's tax reduction philosophy he implemented while
Secretary of the Treasury from 1921 to 1932. For further reading see BARTLEY, supra note 22, at 18,
73,76,89,170,235.
61. See Charles Adams, Beware of the Ides of April: High Taxes-And the Decline and Fall of
Practically Everybody, PoLIcY REvmw, Spring 1994, at 48-53. See also SMrrIH, supra note 2.
62. See generally MEESE. supra note 5, at 133-147.
63. Id.
64. JACK KEMip, REVIviNG THE AmERIcAN DREAM 11 (1994).
65. In Andrew Mellon's words:
The history of taxation shows that taxes which are inherently excessive are not paid. The
high rates inevitably put pressure upon the taxpayer to withdraw his capital from
productive business and invest it in tax-exempt securities or to find other lawful methods
of avoiding the realization of taxable income. The result is that the sources of taxation
are drying up; wealth is failing to carry its share of the tax burden; and capital is being
diverted into channels which yield neither revenue to the Government nor profit to the
people.
ANDREW MELLON, TAXATION: THE PEOPLES BusINEss 13 (1924).
66. PAUL CRAio ROBERTS, THE SUPPLY-SIDE REvoLurloN: AN INSIDER'S ACcouNT OF POLCYMAKING
IN WASHNGTON 76 (1984); see also Steve Forbes, Address to the National Federation of Independent
Business, Washington, D.C., Oct. 23, 1995.
67. See generally ROBERT L. HEILBRONER & LESTER C. THuRow, ECONOMICS ExPLAIaNF 112-114
(updated ed. 1987); ROBERTS, supra note 66.
68. Although President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, his tax proposal was submitted by
Lyndon Johnson, largely unchanged, to Congress in 1964. See HALL & RAausHKA, supra note 11, at 43;
see also JAMES N. GIoLo, THE PRESIDENCY OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 135-139 (1991).
69. DAVID MERVIN, RONALD REAoAN & THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 110-149 (1990).
70. CONTRAcr wrr AMERICA: THE BOLDPLAN BY REP. NEwT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY AND
THE HOUSE REPULICANS TO CHANoE Tim NATION 125-41 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
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emulated, though certainly to different degrees, throughout many parts
of the world.7 1
The question of Secretary Mellon's policies has clearly demarcated
two main groups of historians and legal scholars: Conservatives, those
who largely accept Mellon's taxation philosophy as sound; and liber-
als,72 those who largely reject Mellon's taxation philosophy as unsound
and regressive. 73
Before outlining the argument against the Mellon plan, it is impor-
tant, in the interests of providing the full political landscape of the times,
to elaborate somewhat upon Secretary Mellon's principle legislative
opposition, the Progressives.74 With the ratification of the Sixteenth
Amendment to the Constitution in 1913,75 granting Congress sweeping
powers to lay and collect taxes on incomes, Progressives sought to
reshape the federal government's role in the United States. During the
so-called Progressive period, from about 1900 to about 1920, the
Progressive votaries-including Senators Robert M. LaFollette of Wiscon-
sin, George W. Norris of Nebraska, and James Couzens of Michigan-
71. PAUL JOHNSON, MODERN TIMES: THE WORLD FROM TE TwENTIEs To THE NINETIES 697-98 (rev.
ed. 1992); HENRY R. NAU, T HE MYTH OF AMERICA'S DECLNE: LEADING THE WORLD ECONOMY INTO THE
1990s, at 230-234 (1990); HENRY MILNER, S wEDaN: SocLAL DE oc RAC NCPEACTcE 65 (1989); Paul
Craig Roberts, The World Knows That Reaganomics Was Right, Bus. WK. Sept. 27, 1993, at 22.
Another excellent international example of increased reliance on free market capitalism and
individual economic liberty is the Chilean reform process began in 1974, which, though not without
some setbacks, continues to this day. See Pamela Normann, Chile: A Status Report on Privatization,
Bus. AM., May 18, 1992, at 19. Perhaps the most celebrated international example of this type of tax
reform philosophy, broadly speaking, is the United Kingdom under Prime Minister Thatcher. The
1979 budget contained:
[A] cut in the basic rate of income tax from 33 percent to 30 percent (with the highest
cut from 83 to 60 percent), tax allowances increased by 9 percent above the rate of
inflation, and the introduction of a new, unified rate of VAT at 15 percent.
Apart from the budget's big income tax cuts, however, we were able to reduce or
remove the controls on a number areas of economic life.
MARGARET THATCHER, THE DOWNING SIEET YEARS 43 (1993).
72. I will use the terms liberal, leftist, critical analysis, and revisionist historians interchangeably.
73. While I realize the injustice of so broadly categorizing two such diverse groups of historians
and legal scholars, I must ask the reader for indulgence. For the purpose of simplicity, one must have
terms with which the critical analysis can be categorized. Please accept these terms in this light. The
term conservative is offered in the sense of the 19th century classical liberalism. This area of schol-
arship tends to employ the individual as its unit of analysis. See FRiEDRICH A. HAYEK,THE ROAD TO
SERFDoM (1944); FREDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 14; HAYEK, supra note 25. The term liberal is util-
ized in the tradition of those who tend to employ a more group-based unit of analysis. In addition, this
area of scholarship argues that government has a legitimate function in redistributing wealth in order
to close inequalities and provide for meaningful "social justice." See Kornhauser, supra note 55, at
119; see also GALBRArTH, supra note 51.
74. See TINDALL, supra note 56, at 940-979 (discussing progressivism).
75. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVI.
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believed the federal government ought to play proactive role 76 in closing
the gaps of social and economic inequality in America.77
The Progressive's dream, for an interventionist federal govern-
ment,78 came to be largely realized under President Wilson's war pre-
paredness program in 1916 and, more significantly, with the United
States entrance in the First World War in 1917.79 To finance these
programs, President Wilson, rejecting his previously held Jeffersonian
view of the role of government,8 0 appealed to Congress to boost the
income tax rate and expand the federal government's regulatory juris-
diction.8 1 The federal government not only raised the personal and
76. According to David J. Rothman:
To realize the promise of American life, the public sector would have to dominate the
private sector. The state, not the individual, would define the common good and see it to
its fulfillment. In short, the major tenet of Progressive thought was that only the state
could make the individual free. Only the enlarged authority of the government could
satisfy the particular needs of all the citizens.
David J. Rothman, The State as Parent, in CoNFLIcr AND CONSENSUS, supra note 52, at 259,261-62.
77. It must also be said that there existed some important Republican opposition to the policies of
Secretary Mellon. GEORGE W. NORRIS, Ftormo LEBERAL 245,286-288 (1945).
78. Louis Fniam, DicnoNARY OF AmucAN CoNsERvATISM 261 (1987).
79. Howard, supra note 42, at 49.
80. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., THE AOE OF ROOSEVELT: THE CRiSIS 0F THE OLD ORDER,
1919-1933, at 40 (1957).
81. FoLsoM, supra note 57, at 107.
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corporate tax rates, but also set price controls, 82 controlled industrial
production, and ballooned the national debt.83
The stage was set then for an ideological clash at the end of the First
World War. Three successive Republican administrations, those of
Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and, to a lesser extent, Herbert Hoo-
ver,84 provided the backdrop for the political contest between the Pro-
gressives, who did not want to see their war time gains rolled back, and
the Conservatives who, in terms of taxation and regulatory burden,
wanted a rapid dismantling of "war socialism." 85
82. The January 14, 1994 edition of the WALL STREET JOURNAL contained a valuable contempo-
rary criticism, signed by 562 economists, of governmental price controls in the context of President
Clinton's 1993 Health Security Act. The article reads:
Dear President Clinton:
Price controls produce shortages, black markets and reduced quality. This has
been the universal experience in the 4,000 years that governments have tried to
artificially hold prices down using regulations.
You insist that your health care plan avoids price controls. We respectfully
disagree. Your plan sets the fees charged by doctors and hospitals, caps annual spending
on health care, limits insurance premiums, and imposes price limitations on new and
existing drugs.
In countries that have imposed these types of regulations, patients face delays of
months and years for surgery, government bureaucrats decide treatment options instead
of doctors or patients, and innovations in medical techniques and pharmaceuticals are
dramatically reduced....
In the 1970s, government tried to regulate the price of simple homogenous
product, gasoline. The result was a social and economic disaster. People were forced to
waste hours waiting in lines to purchase gasoline. Long waits for surgery and other
medical care will have far more serious consequences.
Caps, fee schedules and other government regulations may appear to reduce
medical spending, but such gains are illusory. We will instead end up with lower-quality
medical care, reduced medical innovation, and expensive new bureaucracies to monitor
compliance. These controls will hurt people, and they will damage the economy. We
urge you to remove price controls, in any form, from your health care plan.
Dear Mr. President .... WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1994, at A10.
83. Burton Folsom Jr. outlined some of the measures passed by Congress:
[When] the U. S. entered the First World War: expenses soared to the highest levels in
U. S. history; massive government programs bought food, weapons, and equipment for
America and her allies. The government also set prices and wages, and controlled
production of scores of industries. Wilson used the income tax to raise much of the
money needed to wage war: rates started at 4 percent and soared to 77 percent on top
incomes. Corporate taxes rose to 18 percent. Most Americans were willing to sacrifice
for this emergency and paid over $7 billion in taxes[, however] ... the national debt had
skyrocketed from $1.5 billion in 1916 to $24 billion in 1919.
FOLSOM, supra note 57, at 107.
84. FORREST McDONALD, A CoNsTrronoNAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 177-185 (2d ed.
1986).
85. See TINDALL, supra note 56, at 1020-22 (discussing transition from wartime to peacetime).
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IV. CRITICISM OF SECRETARY MELLON'S TAX REFORM PLAN
As a beginning, this section will focus on the criticism of Secretary
Mellon's tax reduction plan.8 6 The case against Mellon's tax cuts is
premised upon considering the general fairness of the Revenue Acts of
1921,87 1924,88 and 1926,89 respectively. 90 Fulminators of the Mellon
plan maintained that the tax cut favored the rich at the expense of the
poor and the middle class.91 The "trickle-down" 92 effect, they noted,
never "trickled-down ."93
Clearly, as the argument goes, Mellon's tax policies figured promi-
nently in this gross disparity, "[tihe reduction of taxation for the rich
and the transfer of as much of the burden as possible to the middle and
lower incomes was a matter of principle with Mellon, and not merely
self-interest." 94 Upon confirmation, Mellon urged Congress to pass The
Revenue Act of 1921, which contained two key provisions. 95 First, Mel-
lon proposed "the outright repeal of the excess profits tax," 96 and sec-
ond, "an immediate reduction of the maximum surtax rate from 65 per
cent to 40 per cent, with an ultimate goal of only 33 per cent. This
would leave unchanged the taxes on income below $66,000."97 Senator
86. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 58, at 334 (showing effect of Mellon tax cut).
87. According to Christopher Frenze, the Revenue Act of 1921, H.R. 8245 was reported fav-
orably by the House Committee on Ways and Means on August 16, 1921, and passed by the House of
Representatives on August 20, 1921. The measure was also favorably reported by the Senate Com-
mittee on Finance on August 20, 1921, and was passed by the Senate on November 7, 1921. After
Congress issued and passed a conference committee report, President Harding signed the Act into law
on November 23, 1921. STAFF OF JOINT EcoNoMc Comm., 97TH CONG., 2D S Es., THE MELLON AND KEN-
NEDY TAX CuTs: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIs 6 (Christopher Frenze) (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter
Frenze].
88. The Revenue Act of 1924, HR. 6715 was favorably reported out of the House Committee on
Ways and Means on February 11, 1924, and was passed by the House of Representatives on February
29, 1924. It was favorably reported out of the Senate Committee on Finance on April 10, 1924, and
was then passed by the Senate on May 10, 1924. A conference committee report was issued and pas-
sed by Congress and it was then signed into law on June 2, 1924, by President Coolidge. Id. at 9.
89. The Revenue Act of 1926, H.R. 1 was favorably reported out of the House Committee on
Ways and Means on December 7, 1925, and passed by the House of Representatives on December
18, 1925. The Senate committee on Finance favorably reported the measure on January 20, 1926,
which was then passed by the Senate on February 12, 1926. A conference report was issued and
passed by Congress, and the measure was signed into law on February 26, 1926, by President Cool-
idge. Id. at 1I.
90. See generally Kornhauser, supra note 55, at 144-54 (discussing taxation during the 1920s).
91. Id.
92. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS PEACE AND LAUGHTER 15-19 (1971) (outlining
Galbraith's suspicion of the reduction of taxes for the express purpose of expanding production and
employment).
93. Kornhauser. supra note 55, at 149 (explaining the view of some Democrats during the 1920s
that tax cuts for the wealthy does not mean that prosperity will "ooze" to those earning less).
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Norris, a prominent Progressive from Nebraska, dourly condemned Mel-
lon for advocating tax policies that benefitted the Secretary personally,
stating, "Mr. Mellon himself gets a larger personal reduction than the
aggregate of practically all the taxpayers in the state of Nebraska." 98
The Democratic minority opinion of the Ways and Means Committee
assertively condemned the Mellon-inspired Revenue Act of 1921, H.R.
8245.99
Despite the death of President Harding on August 2, 1923,100
Secretary Mellon continued his "solicitude for [the] rich,"101 under the
new Coolidge administration, without hesitation. Supplementary, Wil-
liam Allen White, in his book A Puritan in Babylon, posited that Mel-
lon's influence within the Oval Office had increased with the Coolidge
Presidency, such that "so completely did Andrew Mellon dominate the
White House in the days when the Coolidge administration was at its
zenith that it would be fair to call the administration the reign of Coo-
lidge and Mellon." 102
Ergo, cognizant of his enormous influence in the White House,
Secretary Mellon submitted his 1924 tax proposals. Mellon strongly
backed this legislative package with two significant exceptions; he
opposed an increase in estate taxes and excise taxes. 103 Despite Mellon's
"one-sidedness," Congress passed most of his plan, including the op-
posed punitive estate and excise tax propositions.104 The Republicans
98. THoMAs B. Sn.vER, COOLIDGE AND THE HisToRIANs 111 (1982).
99. Frenze, supra note 87, at 7.
"Why in the name of right and justice should these big profiteering corporations and the
millionaires and multimillionaires who filled their rapacious maw with these fabulous
billions of blood money be relieved of taxation .... Not one of them made a sacrifice,
braved a danger, endured a hardship financially ... but was millions richer after the war
.... It would be a thousand times better to keep the excess profits tax and high surtaxes
on under the existing law and relieve altogether the more than 4,000,000 of our less
fortunate citizens ......
Id. (quoting HR. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 4-5 (1921)).
100. THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN HISTORY 444 (Arthur M. Schlesinger et al. eds., rev. ed. 1993).
101. MARK H. LEFF, THE Lamrrs OF SYMBOLIc REFoRM: THE NEw DEAL AND TAXATION, 1933-1939,
at 49 (1984).
102. Wu.LIAM ALLEN WrTE, A PuRIAN IN BABYLON 251 (1938).
103. John F. Witte opined on Mellon's recommendations:
Consistent with the slogan that "big business was in the saddle" following the 1924
elections, Mellon's proposals reflected the antagonism of business interests .... Mellon
proposed abolishing the gift tax immediately and the estate tax over several years and
lowering the surtax from 40 to 20 percent. .. . His other major proposal, to drop excise
taxes on automobiles, entertainment, admissions, and jewelry, was of course viewed
favorably by affected industries and high-income consumers....
... However, the Mellon program appeared to be a little too one-sided for even
this conservative Congress.




and Democrats agreed, in the Revenue Act of 1924, H.R. 6715, "to a 50
percent reduction in rates and, more importantly, an increase in the cred-
it allowed for payment of state inheritance taxes from the current 25 to
80 percent."105 Yet again, continuing in the same ideological vein, these
measures, the estate tax reduction and credits, benefitted only the weal-
thy.106 Clearly, one could argue this was an example "of Secretary
Mellon's handsome tax refunds"107 for wealthy Americans, with little
thought for the disadvantaged. 108
The Revenue Act of 1926, H.R. 1 revealed, according to revisionist
historians, yet another lugubrious example of Secretary Mellon's at-
tempt to expunge any vestigial taxation obstacles that stood in the way of
the rich acquiring and maintaining wealth.109 Mellon wanted nothing
less than the wholesale shifting of the federal tax burden from those of
means to low-income groups. 110 The Act, which was signed into law on
February 26, 1926, "extended further benefits to high-income groups
by lowering estate taxes and repealing the gift tax." 11 Mellon consid-
ered the Act to be a more thorough tax reform bill: nominal tax rates
were slashed, surtaxes were cut, personal exemptions were boosted, fed-
eral credit for state inheritance taxes was increased, the gift tax was re-
pealed, and the corporate capital stock tax was abolished along with var-
ious other nuisance taxes.11 2 Moreover, Secretary Mellon was not satis-
105. Id.
106. Kornhauser, supra note 55, at 153-54.
107. HOFSTADTER, supra note 5, at 399.
108. TINDALL, supra note 56, at 1075.
109. See id. (discussing tax policy under Mellon).
110. JOHN M. BLUM ET AL., THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE UNrrED STATES 598
(1963).
Mellon worked unceasingly to cut federal expenditures. Expenses had to be cut if he
was to achieve his collary purpose: the reduction of taxes, especially taxes on men of
means. It was better, he argued, to place the burden of taxes on low income groups. ....
A share of the tax-free profits of the rich, Mellon reassured the country, would
ultimately trickle down to the middle and lower-income groups in the form of salaries
and wages.
Id.
I 11. TINDALL, supra note 56, at 1075.
112. Frenze, supra note 87, at 11.
H.R. 1 represented Mellon's idea of a thorough tax reform; he considered the two
previous acts compromises....
In addition, H.R. 1 sharply chopped surtax rates, especially at the higher bracket
levels. Again, as in the 1924 act, the redefinition and consolidation of the income classes
reduced some marginal rates even more. The maximum surtax rate was lowered from
40 percent on net income over $500,000 to 20 percent on net income over $100,000.
Thus the combined normal and surtax maximum marginal rate was pared 45.6 percent,
from 46 percent to 25 percent.
The act also increased the estate tax exemption from $50,000 to $100,000, and cut
the top rate in half, from 40 percent to 20 percent. The maximum Federal tax credit for
State inheritance taxes paid was increased from 25 percent to 80 percent. Furthermore,
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fled simply with tax reduction targeted at the wealthy;"l 3 he was also
guilty of malversation. Secretary Mellon lavished credits, abatements,
and cash refunds on his own companies and supporters of Republican
politics.114
The left's case rebuking Secretary Mellon's tax policies, executed
under the leadership of Presidents Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and
Herbert Hoover, was fashioned upon one indispensable point: Andrew
Mellon willfully contrived taxation laws that favored those of wealth over
the middle-class and poor. 115 Indeed, even when faced with the onset of
the Great Depression, Mellon lead a faction in the Hoover Cabinet that
argued the Depression would actually re-invigorate American capital-
ism."l6 Consequently, the years 1921 to 1932 saw changes in the federal
income tax burden largely benefiting the wealthy and privileged with
a special 25 percent top estate tax rate was made retroactive to June 2, 1924. The gift
tax was repealed. Several nuisance taxes were also cut and the corporate capital stock
tax abolished. Excise taxes on mahjongg sets, cameras, tires, and the use of U.S. built
boats, as well as other items, were removed. Occupational taxes on brokers and various
proprietors were nullified.
Id.
113. FOLSOM, supra note 57, at 120 (quoting IRwtN UNOER, THESE UNITED STATES: THE QUESTIONS
OF OUR PAST 676 (4th ed., 1989)).
Like most business people and many politicians of this era, Mellon believed that the
nation's well-being depended on the proper climate for business investment and
incentive. Convinced that the high corporate and personal income taxes . . . were
hampering enterprise, he persuaded Congress to eliminate the wartime excess-profits tax
and to reduce income tax rates at the upper levels while leaving those at the bottom
untouched. Between 1920 and 1929 Mellon won further victories for his drive to shift
the tax burden onto the backs of the middle and wage-earning classes.
Id.
114. According to Arthur Schlesinger Jr.:
Nor was tax reduction Mellon's only resource. What he could not reduce, he could often
refund-a process which had the advantage of taking place behind closed doors. Not until
Garner forced the revelation of the figures in 1930 didthe country know what Mellon
had done. In his first eight years at the Treasury, the Secretary dispensed $3.5 billion in
the shape of cash refunds, credits, and abatements .... Several million dollars went to
Mellon's own companies; other millions, as Garner took pleasure in pointing out, went
where they promised to do the most good to the Republican party.
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OFROOSEVELT: THE C RiSis OF THE OLD ORDER, 1913-1933, at
62-63 (1957).
115. TINDALL, supra note 56, at 1075.
116. EUGENE LYONS, HERBERT HoovER: A BIOGRAPHY 245 (1964).
One school-a majority in political life generally but a minority in the Cabinet-was
typified by Andrew Mellon, the Administration's first Secretary of the Treasury. It has
been called Social Darwinist, committed to the survival of the fittest....
Those who thought like Mellon felt that after a runaway boom a sobering bust was not
entirely evil. They held that it performed painful but needful services in liquidating
swollen prices and wages, inflated real estate values and a gambling psychology; that if
not artificially restrained, it would eliminate incompetents, misfits, parasites. There was,
indeed, a touch of American puritanism in their view, in that it countenanced punishment
for the wicked and prescribed a new austerity.
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only limited tax relief directed toward lower-income groups. 117 A
contemporary of Secretary Mellon, Democratic leader in the House John
Lance Garner, characterized the 1920s' tax policies in an interesting
manner when he promulgated "that the Mellon plan had, 'for its sole
purpose the reduction of the larger taxpayers at the expense of the
smaller taxpayer."' 1 18
V. A DEFENSE OF SECRETARY MELLON'S TAX POLICIES
This portion of the article surveys the conservative historian's
interpretation of Secretary Mellon's taxation policies. The conservative
position can be summarized into two main elements. First, by employ-
ing the basic truth recognized so eloquently by President Kennedy some
forty years later, 119 the three tax acts framed by Secretary Mellon in
1921, 1924, and 1926,120 decreased the tax burden on the lower and
middle income groups by shifting the tax burden to the wealthiest of
Americans. 121 Second, at the same time revenue increased for the
federal government, state revenue in the form of estate taxes was protect-
ed and the federal debt was paid down by over a third in ten years. 122
During the closing years of the First World War, there was a growing
realization in the Treasury Department that heavy war surtaxes were
driving capital away from productive enterprises where it could be taxed
toward tax-free municipal and state bonds. 123 President Woodrow
Wilson's Treasury Secretary, David Houston, considered this a serious
problem for the United States. Secretary Houston was concerned about
not only excessive surtaxes, but also their effect on foreign trade 124 and
capital formation. 125
117. TiNDALL, supra note 56, at 1075.
118. FOLsoM, supra note 57, at 116.
119. President Kennedy in a speech before the Economic Club of New York in 1962 said: "It is
a paradoxical truth that tax rates are too high today and tax revenues are too low and the soundest way
to raise revenues in the long run is to cut rates now." KEMP, supra note 64, at 10.
120. Frenze, supra note 87, at 6-11 (referring to The Revenue Act of 1921, H.R. 8245, The Rev-
enue Act of 1924, HR. 6715, and The Revenue Act of 1926, H.R. 1, respectively).
121. BARTLEY, supra note 22, at 73.
122. ROBERTS, supra note 66, at 76.
123. FOLSOM, supra note 57, at 108-09.
124. For further treatment of the topic of international trade generally, see Professor and Min-
ister for Economics in the German Federal Republic LuDwIG ERHAR, GERMANY'S COMEBACK IN THE
WORLD MARKET (Herbert Gross ed. & W.H. Johnson trans., 1954).
125. Frenze, supra note 87, at 3.
"Since the adoption of the heavy war surtaxes in the revenue act of 1917, the Treasury
has repeatedly called attention to the fact that these surtaxes are excessive; that they
have passed the point of maximum productivity and are rapidly driving the wealthier tax-
payers to transfer their investments into the thousands of millions of tax-free securities
which compete so disastrously with the industrial and railroad securities upon the ready
purchase of which the development of industry and the expansion of foreign trade inti
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Indeed, in 1916 the number of individuals reporting an income of
over $300,000 was 1,296 with an aggregate net income of $992,972,986.
By 1921, the number of Americans reporting incomes of over $300,000
had dropped to 246, with the aggregate net income falling to only
$153,534,305.126 At the same time those with incomes of over $300,000
saw their contribution as a percentage of the total surtax collected fall
from 66.8% in 1916 to only 20.6% in 1921.127 Therefore, despite tax
rates rising from 4% to 73% on high income earners, the wealthy were
shouldering less of the tax burden in 1921 than they had been in 1916.
It was this predicament which Andrew Mellon confronted upon arriving
in Washington.
Mellon ab initio realized the high income tax rates "were the chief
parasites draining the lifeblood of the American economy."128 Despite
the hortatory arguments of the Progressives, demanding so-called
"fairness" in the tax system, the high tax rates were simply not achiev-
ing their objective. Secretary Mellon phrased the dilemma aptly:
The high rates inevitably put pressure upon the taxpayer to
withdraw his capital from productive business and invest it in
tax-exempt securities . . . . The result is that the sources of
taxation are drying up; wealth is failing to carry its share of the
tax burden; and capital is being diverted into channels which
yield neither revenue to the Government nor profit to the
people.129
Consequently, the Secretary then set about restructuring the tax
system with a broad four-point plan. First, he sought to cut the top mar-
ginal rate to 25% from 73%.130 Second, Mellon wanted to cut taxes on
low incomes in 1921; "the existing rates were 4 percent on those in-
comes of $4000 or less, and 8 percent on incomes over $4000. Mellon
wanted to cut these rates from 4 to 3% and from 8 to 6%." 131 Moreover,
"he also suggested an income-tax credit of 25 percent on earned in-
come-that is, income earned by wages would be taxed less than income
earned through investments. Mellon also proposed a repeal of the fed-
eral taxes on telegrams, telephones, and movie tickets."132 Third, he
mately depend."
Id. (quoting ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE STATE OF INANCES FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENoED JUNE 30, 1920, H.R. Doc. No. 1036, 66th Cong., 3d Sess. 36 (1921)).
126. MELLON, supra note 65, at 74.
127. Id. at 75-76.
128. FOLsOM, supra note 57, at 108.
129. MELLON, supra note 65, at 13.
130. BARTLEY, supra note 22, at 73.




called for a reduction in the federal estate tax. 133 Fourth and finally, he
set about improving efficiency in government.134 Implementation of
this four point plan, Mellon argued, would, "lift the country out of
recession, decrease the attractiveness of tax shelters, and ultimately
increase revenue to the Treasury."1 35
Contained in the Revenue Act of 1921, in addition to the cut in the
top tax rates, were several provisions that were completely ignored in the
revisionist scholarship heretofore examined. The first was an increase in
the corporate income tax rate from 10% to 12.5%.136 The Act also
increased the personal exemption, increased the tax credit for depen-
dents, and eliminated the bottom surtax bracket.137 The net result of the
act was far different than the Ways and Means Democrats claimed it
would be.138 Indeed, the effect was exactly opposite to the Democrats
cursory assertions. 139 Clearly, Secretary Mellon's tax proposal was
something less than simply, "a windfall for the rich." 140 One finds that
this was true throughout the 1920s, the rich paid more tax under the
Mellon plan than they had under a so-called "progressive" tax sys-
tem. 141
With respect to the Revenue Act of 1924, what historians John Witte
and Richard Hofstadter failed to mention was that the Coolidge and
133. Id. at 113.
134. Id.
135. Frenze, supra note 87, at 1.
136. Id. at 6. As Christopher Frenze noted:
The act increased the personal exemption from the previous $2,000 to $2,500 for
married couples with joint income less than $5,000. It also doubled the credit for depen-
dents from $200 to $400 ....
In addition, the act simplified the law by eliminating the bottom surtax bracket
($5,000-$6,000), thus raising the surtax exemption to $6,000.
Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 7.
139. Id.
The harsh criticism of the Act as a giveaway to the rich was not to be borne out by the
facts. Between 1921 and 1922 individual income taxes paid by the very wealthy [annual
income over $50,000J increased over 40 percent, from $318 million to $446 million.
Moreover, their share of the total individual tax burden rose 18 percent, from 44 percent
to 51.8 percent. Meanwhile, the proportion of income taxes paid by those making under
$5,000 slipped from 12.9 percent to 11.1 percent. Total individual tax revenues increased
about 20 percent, from $719 million to $861 million in 1922.
Id. (footnote omitted).
140. Frenze, supra note 87, at 7.
141. FOLSOM, supra note 57, at 103-04. This point has been further bolstered by Robert E. Hall
and Alvin Rabushka. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 11, at 42. From 1921 to 1926 as a group, those
earning less than $10,000 saw tax revenues collected from them fall by 79%. Id. Those earning from
$10,000 to $25,000 saw tax revenues collected from them fall by 43%. Id. Those earning between
$25,000 and $50,000 saw tax revenues collected from them rise by 1%. Id. Those earning between
$50,000 and $100,00 saw tax revenues collected from them rise by 23%. Id. Those making over
$100,000 saw tax revenues collected from them riseby 86%. Id.
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Mellon tax cuts called for "a reduction of the normal rates by 25
percent for all taxpayers, rich and poor. It was for this reason, among
others, that the tax bill was widely supported among all categories of
taxpayers and in all sections of the country."1 42 Further, one can infer,
from the Secretary's statements in 1924, that he believed that the tax
burden ought to fall upon those most able to bear it when he stated that,
"[iun making its recommendations, the Treasury has been guided by the
necessity first, of providing a sufficient income for the government;
second, of lightening the tax burden, so far as possible, on those least
able to bear it."143 As well, John Witte's specious contention, outlined
previously, concerning the 1924 Revenue Act is extremely puzzling.
Witte claimed that Mellon's proposals "to drop excise taxes on automo-
biles, entertainment, admissions, and jewelry, was... viewed favorably
by" the wealthy.144 Mr. Witte was either being disingenuous, or has a
rather tenuous grip on basic economics. Excise taxes are perhaps the
most regressive taxes possible because these consumption taxes always
hit those least able to pay the hardest.145 Therefore, dropping excise
taxes, in virtually any circumstance, does little to help the wealthy, but
rather significantly benefits those in the middle and lower income
brackets. 146
The 1926 Revenue Act, and Mellon's tax policy in general, has
been subjected to considerable condemnation by critics.147 Revisionists
have jejunely claimed that Mellon shifted the tax burden from the
wealthy, to the middle and wage earning classes. This criticism notwith-
standing, statistical evidence collected from that period directly contra-
dicted the revisionist contention that Mellon's policies favored the
wealthy.148 Therefore, not only were the wealthy paying more under the
142. SiLvER, supra note 98, at 106.
143. Id. at 108 (citation omitted).
144. WrrrE, supra note 102, at 94.
145. BRADLEY R. SCHiLLER, THE MACRO ECONOMY TODAY 74-75 (5th ed. 1991).
146. Id.
147. HOFSTADTER, supra note 5, at 399.
148. FOLSOM, supra note 57, at 112. This point was also clearly illustrated by the research of
Christopher Frenze:
The tax revenue derived from the very wealthy under the provisions of the 1926 act
(calendar years 1925-26) increased substantially over 1924. Individual income tax
revenues increased $30 million overall between 1924 and 1925, with the share paid by
the very wealthy increasing 7 percent to almost 70 percent. Curiously, about the same
amount of revenue was collected for 1926; but the proportion paid by the very wealthy
increased again in 1927 to 72.8 percent. Furthermore, the percentage of tax revenues
paid by those with incomes in excess of $1 million jumped from 6.7 percent in 1924 to...
11.2 percent in 1926.
Frenze, supra note 87, at 11-12.
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Mellon plan, 149 but the proportion of individual income taxes paid by
those earning under $5,000 dropped precipitously. 150
The third part of Secretary Mellon's broad strategy was the reduc-
tion of federal estate taxes. 15 1 This was premised upon two main points.
First, he believed that high inheritance taxes, like high income taxes,
tempted the wealthy to transfer assets before they died, thereby depriving
the government of any revenue. 15 2 Second, and more importantly,
Mellon realized that estate taxes were an important source of revenue for
state governments. 153 Consequently, any rise in federal estate taxes
would reduce revenue for the states, as Mellon noted "the estate tax
furnishes but a slight portion of the revenues to the Federal Government
but it supplies a large and important part of the State revenues." 154 It is
clear, then, from the Secretary's statement that he opposed the federal
estate tax, not to placate the wealthy but rather, because he did not wish
to deprive the states of an important source of revenue. 155
The fourth part of Mellon's plan focused upon efficiency in
government by targeting revenue at government programs rather than
interest on the national debtl5 6 Andrew Mellon was deeply disturbed by
the debt the United States had accumulated as a result of the First World
War. 157 He sought, therefore, to reduce the national debt. 158 Mellon
achieved some success to that end and as Claude Fuess noted, "[iut is
worth noting that the interest-bearing national debt at the close of 1926
stood at $19,300,000,000 as compared with $26,300,000,000 in 1919...
An accomplishment regarded in those times as worthy of high
praise." 159 By the close of the 1920s, 36% of the national debt had been
paid off.160
The conservative case vindicating Secretary Mellon's tax policies at
the Department of the Treasury has been fashioned upon five rather
elementary points. First, under the Mellon plan of large tax cuts, the
wealthy shouldered considerably more of the income tax burden than
ever before. 161 Second, the poor paid progressively less tax under the
149. RoBERTS, supra note 66, at 76.
150. Frenze, supra note 87, at 12. "This income class paid 6.76 percent of 1924 income taxes,
1.89 percent of 1925 taxes, 1.82 percent of 1926 taxes, and 1.42 percent in 1927." Id.
151. FOLSOM, supra note 58, at 113.
152. WnLIAM H. ANDERSON, TAXATION AND THE AMEMCAN ECONOMY 251-52 (1968).
153. FoLSoM, supra note 57, at 113.
154. MELLON, supra note 65, at 124.




159. CLAUDE M. FUESS, CALVIN COOLIDGE: THE MAN FROM VERMoNT 382 (1940).
160. PAUL CRAIa ROBERTS, THE SUPPLY-SIDE REVOLUTION 76 (1984).
161. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 58, at 334.
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Mellon plan.162 Third, the above income tax cuts were achieved while at
the same time increasing the Treasury Department's overall revenue. 163
Fourth, Mellon protected an important source of state revenue by
reducing the federal estate tax. 164 Fifth, and finally, all of the above were
achieved while the United States paid down over a third of its national
debt over an approximate ten year period165 and experienced tremen-
dous economic growth.166
The debate over Andrew Mellon's tenure at the Department of the
Treasury is part of a much broader ideological debate. One school of
thought contends, irrespective of this particular debate over the policies
of Secretary Mellon, that tax rates ought to remain high on the wealthy
as a matter of socialist redistributionism, a form of social justice if you
will.167 The opposing school of thought maintains that a free society
ought to minimize coercion168 in order to maximize individual freedom
and liberty.169 Resolution of the policy debate over tax law in the 1920s
and its ramifications can be a constructive step in that direction. Andrew
Mellon, fittingly, framed this debate on his terms, stating "[tiaxation
should not be used as a field for socialistic experiment, or a club to
punish success, but as a means of raising revenue to support the govern-
ment," he continued noting that,"[t]he enemies of the income tax are
not those seeking to reduce its excessive rates but those who insist that
the high rates, which have proven economically incorrect, will re-
main."170
162. FOLSOM, supra note 57, at 112-113.
163. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 58, at 334 (citing the Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of In-
come-1921-1925: Individual Income Tax Returns; Tax Foundation).
164. FOLSOM, supra note 57, at 113.
165. PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS, THE SUPPLY-StDE REVOLUTION 76 (1984).
166. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT: TRANSMITrED TO CONGRESS JANUARY 1989, at 27, H.
Doc. No. 101-02, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter 1989 ECONOMIC REPORT]. The period from
1920 to 1929 saw the United States gross national product/gross domestic product grow at the average
annual rate of 4.3% per year, while Germany and France grew at 4.9%, Japan at 3.4%, Italy at 3.0%,
U.K. at 1.9%, and Canada at 4.0%. Id. The economic growth, however, is even more impressive if
one examines the years 1921 to 1926 where the GNP grew at an annual rate in excess of 8% with
prices remaining relatively stable. Frenze, supra note 87, at 10, 16. Manufacturing production also
saw a dramatic increase from 1921 to 1927, the food industry was up 35%; textiles and apparel up
46%; petroleum and coal up 50%; paper products up 77%; transportation equipment up 80%; chem-
icals up 93%; primary metals up 100%; and rubber products up 117%. Id. Between 1924 and 1925
unemployment dropped 27.3%. Id.
167. See generally DONALD L. BARLETT AND JAMES B. STEELE, AMERICA: WHAT WENT WRONG?
(1992).
168. Coercion in the present circumstance refers directly to excessive compulsory taxation under
threat of punishment by law.
169. HAYEK, supra note 73, at 17-21.
170. Frenze, supra note 87, at 4.
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VI. IDEOLOGICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF SECRETARY MELLON'S
TAX POLICIES BEYOND THE 1920s
The onset of the Great Depression and the twelve-year "New Deal"
Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt171 prompted many observers, on
both the ideological right and left, to relegate Mellon's supply-side
philosophy to the ash-heap of history.172 It resurfaced, however, in one
of the most unlikely places-the economic program of Democratic
President John F. Kennedy.173
With respect to domestic economic policy, President Kennedy, in
1962, was concerned about the possibility of the economy slipping into
recession and sought to reverse the rather lackluster performance of the
stock market.174 He realized that the traditional Keynesian approach175
to spur the economy was no longer sufficient.176 Drawing upon the
171. HOFSTADTER, supra note 5, at 411-445.
172. See GALBRAITH, supra note 53, at 51-134 (discussing relevant time period).
173. For an account of the intervening years see PAUL, supra note 34, at 421-764. See also KLEIN
& BANXmAN, supra note 36, at 8-16.
174. Jim F. HEATH, JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE BusINEss ComtuNrIY 114-122 (1969).
175. See generally JOHN MAvNARD KaE'Nis, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLA)YMENT, INTEREST AND
MONEY (1936). William F. Buckley Jr. provided an evaluation of the economic theory of Lord Keynes
in general, and John Kenneth Galbraith in particular:
It is the dawning realization that, under the economics of illusion, pyramid building is be-
coming a major economic enterprise in America, that has set advanced liberals to finding
more persuasive ways to dispose of the time of the textile specialty workers. And their
solution-vide Galbraith-is great social enterprises, roads, schools, slum clearance, na-
tional parks. The thesis of the Affluent Society is that simple. We have 1) an earned
surplus, 2) unemployment, 3) "social imbalance." (i.e., too many cars, not enough roads;
too much carbon dioxide, not enough air purification; too many children, not enough
classrooms.) So let the government 1) take over the extra money, 2) use it to hire the un-
employed, and 3) set them to restoring the social balance, i.e., to building parks, schools,
roads.
WILLAm F. BucKLEY JR., UP FROM LiBERAUSM 227 (1985).
176. President Kennedy has stated:
The most direct and significant kind of Federal action aiding economic growth is to make
possible an increase in private consumption and investment demand-to cut the fetters
which hold back private spending. In the past, this could be done in part by the increased
use of credit and monetary tools-but our balance of payments situation today places
limits on our uses of those tools for expansion. It could also be done by increasing
Federal expenditures more rapidly than necessary-but such a course would soon
demoralize both the government and the economy. If government is to retain the
confidence of the people, it must not spend a penny more than can be justified on the
grounds of national need and spent with maximum efficiency.
The final and best means of strengthening demand among consumers and business is
to reduce the burden on private income and the deterrents to private initiative which are
imposed by our present tax system-and this Administration pledged itself last summer to
an across-the-board, top-to-bottom cut in personal and corporate income taxes to be
enacted and become effective in 1963.
BRUCE BARTLET, REAANOMICS: SUPPLYSIDEECONOMICS IN ACTION 114-15 (1981) (quoting speech by
President John F. Kennedy before the Economic Club of New York on December 14, 1962).
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American experience in the 1920s, President Kennedy, in a 1962 speech
before the Economic Club of New York, outlined bold new thinking to
encourage economic growth, "It is a paradoxical truth that tax rates are
too high today and tax revenues are too low and the soundest way to
raise revenues in the long run is to cut rates now." 177
With that rather forceful endorsement of Secretary Mellon's sup-
ply-side prescription for an anemic economy, President Kennedy advo-
cated three main proposals to be embodied in law. First, a reduction of
individual income tax rates from the range of 20 to 91%, to a range of
14 to 65%. The 14% rate applied to the first $2,000 of taxable income
for married persons filing a joint return and to the first $1,000 of taxable
income for single taxpayers. Second, President Kennedy proposed a re-
duction in the corporate tax rate from 52 to 47%. Finally, a revision in
the tax treatment of capital gains was proposed by Kennedy.178 President
Kennedy made these proposals fully cognizant of the fact that, "[tihe
largest single barrier to ...a higher rate of economic growth is the
unrealistically heavy drag of Federal income taxes on private purchasing
power, initiative, and incentive." 179 The Kennedy cuts of 1964 resulted,
almost immediately, in rather robust economic growth180 and increased
revenue to the Treasury Department.'18 The nation would have to wait
almost two decades for this bold experiment to find itself in favor once
again. 8 2
177. Kemp, supra note 64, at 10.
178. John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Tax Reduction and Reform, in PUB.
PAPERs, 1963, at 73-92 (1964).
179. HEATH, supra note 174, at 118.
180. As illustrated by Victor A. Canto, Douglas H. Joines, and Arthur B. Laffer:
[Ulnemployment declined from 6.7 percent to 3.8 percent and capacity utilization as
measured by the Federal Reserve Board increased from 77.3 percent to 91.9 percent.
During this period, real GNP grew at an average annual rate of 5.9 percent. The
average growth in nominal GNP was 7.5 percent, while federal government expendi-
tures grew at a rate of 6.2 percent. Consequently, the ratio of government expenditures
to GNP fell. It thus seems unlikely that the increase in economic activity can be
attributed entirely to the stimulus of increased government spending.
Victor A. Canto, et al., Tax Rates, Factor Employment, and Market Production, in THE S upPLY-SIDE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC POucY 3, 19 (1981).
181. Frenze, supra note 87, at 25 (observing that:
In this period consumer spending and tax revenues rebounded while productivity growth
rose and labor costs decreased. In the meantime, inflation as measured by the GNP
price deflator was almost imperceptible, crawling at an annual rate of about 13/4 per-
cent.
Although the Treasury estimated that the 1962-64 tax legislation would result in
revenue losses of $89 billion over a six year period starting in 1963, revenue actually
increased $54 billion during this time).
182. For an account of the intervening years, see PAUL, supra note 34, at 421-764.
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Given the time that has past since the 1980 Presidential election, it is
perhaps understandable that one does not immediately recall the stark
contrast that was presented to the American people. In the midst of 13%
inflation, 21.5% interest rates, 183 falling household income,18 4 and an
unemployment rate of 7.4%,185 President Carter lamented that America
had, perhaps, lost confidence in itself and that there was a crisis "fit the
very heart and soul and spirit of our national will."186 A national
"malaise" had set in.187 President Carter's malaise notwithstanding,
Ronald Reagan spoke of an idealism and an optimism rooted in determi-
nation, courage and strength-equal to the task of building a greater
tomorrow .188 In order to achieve this renewal, at least in terms of domes-
tic economic policy, Ronald Reagan, understanding the historical impor-
tance of this idea,189 once again resurrected Mellon's supply-side philos-
ophy,190 as a theme in his election in 1980 and his overwhelming land-
slide re-election in 1984.191 President Reagan's tax plan was relatively
simple:
I believed that if we cut tax rates . . . the economy would
receive a stimulus that would bring down inflation, unemploy-
ment, and interest rates, and there would be such an expansion
of economic activity that in the end there would be a net
increase in the amount of revenue to finance the important
functions of government.192
183. ARMEY, supra note 14, at 30.
184. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 58. at 204-15.
185. Id. at 203.
186. JOHNSON, supra note 71, at 697.
187. BARTLEY, supra note 22, at 42.
188. RONALD REAGAN, First Inaugural Address, January 20, 1981, in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM GEORGE WASHINGTONI789 TO GEORGE BUSH 1989, at 331-37
(Bicentennial ed., 1989).
189. As President Reagan stated:
When John F. Kennedy's tax program that he recommended and which was not too dis-
similar to ours, when it was passed, the same thing happened-more revenues at lower
rates. It happened back in Coolidge's administration, and they cut taxes several times in
that period. I can show you again where tax increases have resulted in lower revenues
for the government because of the harmful effect they have on the economy by reducing
incentive and so forth.
REAGAN, supra note 9, at 70.
190. During his second Inaugural Address, President Reagan observed that: "The time has come
for a new American emancipation-a great national drive to tear down economic barriers and liberate
the spirit of enterprise in the most distressed areas of our country. My friends, together we can do this,
and do it we must, so help me God." RONALD REAGAN, Second Inaugural Address, January 21, 1985, in
INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM GEORGE WASHiNGTONI789 TO
GEORGE BUSH 1989, at 341 (Bicentennial ed., 1989).
191. NEWr GINGRICH, To RENEw AMERICA 235 (1995).
192. REAGAN, supra note 7, at 231.
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President Reagan's economic plan achieved precisely what it set out
to do with one notable exception-the national debt.193 The Reagan
Administration cut marginal tax rates for all tax brackets 194 and brought
inflation1 95 and interest rates under control.196 The federal government
193. President Reagan has been forthright in accepting his share of responsibility in this area,
noting that "on the other side of the ledger, cutting federal spending and balancing the budget, I was
less successful than I wanted to be. This was one of my biggest disappointments as president. I just
didn't deliver as much to the people as I had promised." Id. at 335. See also DAvtD FRuM, DEAD RIGr
29 (1994). There is also the question of persistent trade deficits throughout the 1980s. In 1981, the
United States ran a trade surplus of six billion dollars that by 1987 had turned into a $144 billion deficit.
LESTER TliuRow, H EAD TO HEAD: T HE C OMINO ECONOMIC BATrTE A MONO JAPAN, EtmoPE, AND AMERICA
231 (1992). However, not all experts are as disturbed about the trade deficit as is Mr. Thurow.
Kenichi Ohmae has argued that this worry is greatly misplaced. KENICHI OHMAE, THE BORDERLESS
WORLD: PowER AND STRATEGY IN THE INTERLINKED ECONOMY 137-145 (1990).
194. Spencer Abraham, A Pro-Growth Tax Plan, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1996, at A 14.
Newly elected President Ronald Reagan cut tax rates across the board by 25%. Mr.
Reagan could have cut taxes in any number of ways, but he chose reducing marginal tax
rates because he understood that it was not enough just to lower the tax burden. The
marginal tax rate-assessed on the next dollar earned-is the rate that influences
whether a worker works overtime or goes home for the day. It is this tax rate that
determines whether Americans save and invest their income or spend it. A tax cut that
does not affect marginal incentives may stimulate some additional spending, which will
give the economy a temporary boost. But it does nothing to encourage additional saving,
investment or production.
Id. See also HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 11, at 44-45. For further reading on the economic effect
of the three principle tax acts of the 1980s, specifically The Economic Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), The
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA),
see the 1994 ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 15. at 87-90, and the 1989 ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note
166, at 86-94.
195. See PAUL KRUOMAN, THE AGE OF DmINISHED ExPECTATIoNS: U.S. ECONOMIC POLCY IN THE
1990s, at 2 (1990) (using chart to illustrate).
196. McKEN 3E, supra note 23, at 292-306.
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was also downsized.197 Economic growth,198 productivity,1 99 and
enhanced wage growth 200 all saw tremendous gains. The deficit was
eventually brought under control,20 1 and America was put back to
work.202 Moreover, Reagan's administration policy, in the fullness of
197. ARMEY, supra note 14, at 35-36.
President Reagan fired 14.2 percent of the federal regulatory "work" force and reduced
the number of regulations (measured in pages in the Federal Register) by 38.7 percent.
Just as cutting taxes makes people free to spend their own money, cutting regulations
makes people free to conduct their own affairs, and in both cases Reagan was led by his
understanding that freedom works.
Id. See also REGULATION AND THE REAGAN ERA: POLmCS, BUREAUCRACY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 1989).
198. Lawrence Kudlow has illustrated:
The Bush-Clinton economic recovery cycle is vastly inferior to the economy's perform-
ance under Reagan. At a comparable stage, roughly three-and-a-half years from the re-
cession trough, the current jobs expansion of 5.8 million looks anemic compared to Reag-
an's 10A million. Non-farm payrolls in this cycle have increased at an annual rate of 1.5
percent. compared to 3.2 percent under Reagan. Overall real GDP growth in the current
recovery cycle is 2.9 percent a year, compared with Reagan's 4.9 per cent.
... [TIotal workers' compensation, which includes both wages and benefits [ad-
justed for inflation] ... increased at a 1.6 percent annual rate during the early Reagan
recovery and by just 0.7 percent yearly during the Bush-Clinton cycle.
Reagan's personal income, business, and capital-gains tax cuts created a tremen-
dous 7.6 percent annual growth in net new business formations, compared to the Bush-
Clinton record of 4.3 percent.
Lawrence Kudlow, There They Go Again, NATIONAL REv. Nov. 7, 1994, at 28, 28-30. Senator Spencer
Abraham agreed:
The Reagan tax cut, once fully phased in, worked. In 1984, real GDP growth reached
6.8%-the highest single year growth rate since 1951. In President Reagan's second term,
growth averaged 3.4% a year-well above the 2.5% per year average of the last three
years, which President Clinton erroneously calls the best in three decades.
Abraham, supra note 193, at A14.
199. BARTLEY, supra note 22, at 4. "[T]he output of an hour of American labor, grew by 10.6
percent, though it had previously been stagnant for a decade." Id.
200. Lawrence Kudlow, It's Capital Formation, Stupid, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1992, at A18.
"From 1983 to 1989 real after-tax income rose more than 12% for the average of all Americans. The
greatest gains in income in the 1980s were generated by women. On average, the wages earned by
women rose 11% to relative men's wages." Id. This is in sharp contrast to the higher taxes and lack
of wage growth during President Clinton's tenure:
Since 1992, taxes paid by individuals have gone up 25.3% while real median family in-
comes have remained unchanged ....
President Clinton's 1993 tax increase has raised federal receipts from 19.2% of GDP
in President Bush's last year to 20.4% of GDP in 1995-the second highest level in U.S.
history.
Abraham, supra note 194, at A-14.
201. 1989 EcoNomic REPORT, supra note 166, at 8. "We have also made progress in reining in
government expenditures, but much still needs to be done. We have reduced the rate of growth of
Federal spending, and over the past 5 years government spending as a percent of GNP has fallen from
25.1 to 23.2 percent." Id.
202. BARTLEY, supra note 22, at 4.
Manufacturing production grew even faster than GNP, rising by 48 percent over the
expansion .... (Giross private investment grew by 32 percent, in line with GNP. And
just as a demographic surge reached working age, enough jobs were created to boost
civilian employment by 19.5 percent. Between 1982 and 1990, the U. S. economy added
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time, resulted in increased Federal tax revenue 203 and a more equitable
tax burden. 204 Furthermore, an environment through which employ-
ment opportunity for minorities could flourishi05 was encouraged.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Reagan tax cuts brought
18.4 million jobs.
Id.
203. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 58, at 344. Federal tax revenues one year prior to the Reagan Ad-
ministration were $517 billion, by 1988 federal tax revenues had exploded to $909 billion. Id. Even
so, the Reagan Administration's federal tax burden as percent of GDP was 18.7% compared to the
Carter Administration's 19.4% and the Clinton Administration's 19.6%. Id. at 346. Moreover, Thomas
Sowell has exploded the myth that the Reagan tax cuts caused the large budget deficits in the 1980s.
See SowELL, supra note 21, at 82-83. He points out that increased spending, not lower rev-enues were
the cause of the budget deficits:
Contrary to the notion that deficits have resulted from reduced tax receipts by the federal
government, those receipts in fact reached new record highs during the Reagan admin-
istration. Every year of the administration saw the federal government collect more
money than in any year of any previous administration in history .... The idea that tax
cuts-for the rich or otherwise-were responsible for the deficit flies in the face of these
easily obtainable statistics.
Id. at 82-83 (footnotes omitted).
President Clinton does not share Professor Sowell's common sense view, stating: "No one
seriously disputes the fact that a major cause of the Federal deficit being as big as it is, is that there
was a huge cut in income taxes on upper income people." William J. Clinton, Interview with the
Wisconsin Media, in 1 PuB. PAPERS, 1993, at 1123, 1128 (1994).
204. The assertion that the Reagan tax cuts benefited only the wealthy and shifted the tax burden
from the rich to those less able to pay is perhaps the most popular myth of the 1980s. President Clinton
strongly believes that the wealthy did not pay their "fair share" during the 1980s. William J. Clinton,
Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals, in 1 PUB. PAPERs, 1993, at 120
(1994); William J. Clinton, Remarks to the Community in Charleston, West Virginia, in 2 PUB. PAPERS,
1993, at 1350, 1351-52 (1994). President Clinton's rhetoric notwithstanding, the 1980s actually saw
the tax burden become much more equitable, in 1981 the wealthiest top 1% paid 17.6 percent of total
federal income taxes, by 1988 the top 1% was paying 27.5 percent of total federal income taxes.
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 58, at 241. Therefore, not only did the wealthy pay more, but Americans
experienced tremendous upward income mobility in the 1980s. As Dick Armey has commented:
From 1979 to 1988, 85.8 percent of the folks in the lowest quintile [income group] moved
into a higher group. Meanwhile, 60 percent of those in the second quintile moved up.
About 47 percent of those who began the eighties at the middle moved into a higher
quintile. As for fifth, richest quintile, 35 percent moved downward. Among the richest 1
percent of the population, over half moved down. All told, a person in the poorest
income group in 1979 was more likely to end the decade in the richest quintile than to
remain at the bottom.
ARMEY, supra note 14, at 38. Putting statistical evidence aside for the moment, it is difficult to see even
the so-called "fairness" of the progressive tax system. For example, there are two taxpayers, one is a
steel-worker making $30,000 a year and the other is a steel company executive making $300,000.
While the executive makes ten times the salary of the steel worker, her tax bill, all other factors
remaining constant, will be well over ten times that of the steel worker. If fairness, rather than
punishment, was the goal of our tax code should not the executive's tax bill be only ten times greater
than the steel workers?
205. 1989 EcONOMIC REPORT, supra note 166, at 7.
While civilian employment has increased by more than 17 percent, Hispanic employment
has grown by more than 45 percent, black employment by nearly 30 percent, and female
employment by more than 20 percent ... the jobs created are good ones; over 90 percent
of the new jobs are full-time, and over 85 percent of these full-time jobs are in
occupations in which average annual salaries exceed $20,000.
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about the longest peacetime economic expansion in American
History .206
When viewed in this light, the supply-side cuts of Secretary Andrew
Mellon, as incorporated by President Reagan and President Kennedy,
achieved what they claimed: increased economic growth, a more equita-
ble tax burden, higher revenues, and lower unemployment. It would
appear, however, that President Clinton 207 and those in public office lead
astray by the siren song of redistributionism 208 will continue to ignore
the positive economic effects of supply-side tax cuts in the name of
having the wealthy pay their fair share.209
America is not well served by a philosophy that demands redistribu-
tionism and a President that practices the politics of division. Our
national conversation must turn away from envy and the sophists who
preach "fairness." Only by rejecting these falsehoods can we, as a
nation, ensure constructive opportunity for all. To this end, President
Reagan's remarks are instructive in illustrating the eternal truth of this
idea, "My friends, history is clear: Lower tax rates mean greater free-
dom, and whenever we lower rates, our entire nation is better off."210
G. Marc Worthy
206. Kemp, supra note 64, at 1-16.
207. See BOB WOODWARD, THE AGENDA: INSIDE THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE 25-26 (1994)
(discussing Clinton's stance on Reagan's economic policies).
208. See John R. Kasich, On the Cutting Edge: The House GOP Alternative to Clinton's Budget,
PoLicY REv., Summer 1993, at 23-28.
209. William J. Clinton, Interview with the Wisconsin Media, in 1 PuB. PAPERS, 1993, at 445,
1127-28 (1994).
210. REAGAN, supra note 9, at 68.
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